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

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INTRODUCTION

1. The Security Council first considered the question of Liberia at its meeting held on 22 January 1991, when the President of the Council made a statement commending the efforts of the heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 1/ and called upon the parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire agreement (S/22133). At a subsequent meeting on 7 May 1992, the Council again commended ECOWAS and indicated that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991 offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict (S/23886).

2. At its 3138th meeting, held on 19 November 1992, the Council adopted resolution 788 (1992), by which it, inter alia, called upon all parties to the conflict in Liberia to respect and implement the cease-fire and various accords of the peace process; decided, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia, with the exception of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia; requested the Secretary-General to dispatch to Liberia urgently a Special Representative to evaluate the situation, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible; and decided to remain seized of the matter.

3. Immediately following the adoption of resolution 788 (1992), I appointed Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as my Special Representative under the terms of paragraph 7 of the resolution. He was assisted by a Senior Political Affairs Officer from the Department of Political Affairs. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 13 of resolution 788 (1992).

I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

4. Liberia is situated on the west coast of Africa, sharing common borders with Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Independent since 26 July 1847, the country has a population of 2.5 million. Monrovia grew as the commercial centre of the country and the location of the elite settler community. The remainder of the country, largely rural, with an abundance of natural resources, was home to the indigenous population. The conflict in Liberia has its genesis in a complex history of relationships between the settler and the indigenous communities, low levels of literacy among the latter, crushing poverty in the rural areas and a perception that benefits accrued primarily to the population in Monrovia.

5. The immediate origins of the three-year war can be traced to the complete breakdown of law and order and civil authority which accompanied the overthrow in 1990 of the regime headed by President Samuel Doe. The civil war has caused severe casualties and major displacement of the population, both internally and in terms of refugees in countries bordering Liberia. The rupture of the system of civil administration, the cessation of most forms of social services and the disruption of economic activities have resulted in considerable dependence on

humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations.

6. The effects of the prolonged civil war have worsened the fragile state of the economy characteristic of many developing countries during the decade of the 1980s. The de facto division of the country as a result of the civil war into two administrations with separate economic zones, two different domestic currencies with widely varying rates of exchange, further aggravates an already difficult situation. Prolonged shortages of foreign exchange render almost impossible the importation of food, fuel and other essential consumer goods. The banking system has completely broken down with respect to foreign exchange transactions.

7. At present, the country remains partitioned, with the Interim Government of National Unity, headed by President Amos Sawyer, administering Monrovia and its environs, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Mr. Charles Taylor, in control of 10 counties, with its headquarters in Gbarnga and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), led by Mr. Alhaji Kromah, having captured two counties, maintaining its headquarters in Tubmanburg. Most of the productive sectors of the economy (agriculture, forestry, iron ore, rubber and precious metals) are in areas held by NPFL and ULIMO. Monrovia remains the centre for commercial activities but at significantly reduced levels. Efforts at reactivation of the economy have yielded results far below pre-war levels. Some rubber, iron ore and timber were exported through the ports of Buchanan, Greenville and Harper under NPFL control, as well as through Monrovia. Reports have been received indicating that commercial arrangements have been made between NPFL and investors in Europe for the export of timber and iron ore. However, exports have virtually ceased since comprehensive economic sanctions have been applied by ECOWAS since July 1992, although there are continuing reports of some violations.

8. War-related casualties among civilians and armed combatants have been estimated as high as 150,000, with the overwhelming majority being civilians. Young people under 18 years of age are particularly hard hit. Population displacement is a significant consequence of the conflict. Monrovia's population is estimated to have doubled from 400,000 to 850,000 and may have exceeded 1 million since the beginning of the crisis. Liberian refugees now number between 600,000 and 700,000, mainly in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

9. The conflict has resulted in a monumental deterioration in social services. The health care system is plagued by chronic shortages of drugs, fuel and other essential supplies, while an increase in the incidence of malnutrition, gastroenteritis and measles is recorded, particularly among the young. Most schools have remained closed during the crisis. Liberia will continue to depend on relief and humanitarian efforts of private institutions and the international community for the foreseeable future.

10. All United Nations emergency relief and humanitarian programmes in Liberia are coordinated by a United Nations Special Coordinator, drawing upon the staff

and resources of the United Nations Development Programme, in close collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Population Fund, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization. Through regular coordination meetings, the United Nations family and the NGO community have developed integrated programmes (e.g., food aid, especially for vulnerable groups, water and sanitation, disease control, including HIV/AIDS, nutritional surveillance and drug abuse counselling) designed to address the needs of all Liberians in Monrovia and in territory held by both NPFL and ULIMO.

11. In 1991, arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian assistance had been carefully worked out by the United Nations Special Coordinator, with the NPFL and the Interim Government. Under the prevailing conditions, delivery of such assistance can be quite hazardous, depending on the level of insecurity and problems of logistics. Most of the drugs, food and other relief supplies have been imported, stored and distributed in and around Monrovia, where the bulk of the displaced population resides. Since October 1992, some stores are maintained in Danane and Man in Côte d'Ivoire and in Gbarnga, for use in NPFL territory. The inability to deliver sufficient quantities to NPFL territory continues to be a source of concern, particularly with regard to the provision of fuel. Viewed as a strategic commodity in a war situation, but needed for the functioning of hospitals, the delivery of fuel is often delayed at the border with Côte d'Ivoire and only dispatched in small quantities under the supervision of international United Nations or NGO staff.

12. Responding to concerns of sanctions violations expressed by the Interim Government, my Special Representative reviewed various route options for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Of the possibilities via Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, through a peace corridor from Monrovia to Kakata or, from Monrovia to the port of Buchanan, the most direct and convenient route continues to be via Côte d'Ivoire. Although this is consistent with security concerns and logistic feasibility, reports are received from time to time regarding difficulties of strict compliance with sanctions.

13. I have launched several appeals for humanitarian assistance to Liberia. Of the total of $161 million requested, a funding gap of US$ 57 million remains, covering priority areas of food aid, health, water and sanitation, agriculture and assistance to displaced persons and refugees, former combatants and children. Given the extent of the damage caused by the civil war in Liberia, it will be necessary for the United Nations and the entire international community to support a comprehensive programme for reconstruction and development once peace has returned to the country. As a first step this should involve a needs assessment, to be undertaken by the United Nations development system, in association with the Bretton Woods institutions, the African Development Bank and interested Governments.

III. ECOWAS PEACE INITIATIVES

14. The fighting which engulfed Liberia and the massive destruction and large loss of human life which followed in its wake have led to intensive West African diplomatic efforts. The repercussions of the Liberian civil war on neighbouring countries, particularly on Sierra Leone, have underlined the international dimension of the conflict.

15. ECOWAS has since 1990 been preoccupied with the situation in Liberia. It has operated under provisions of the Protocol on Non-Aggression, adopted at the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, held in Dakar, Senegal, on 22 April 1978, and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence adopted in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981. The initiatives of ECOWAS have included the creation of an ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 2/ by the Standing Mediation Committee at Banjul, Gambia, on 7 August 1990. The primary function of ECOMOG was to keep peace, restore law and order and ensure that a cease-fire agreed to by the warring factions in Liberia was respected. Since its deployment in Liberia, in August 1990, ECOMOG has succeeded in restoring a measure of order in Monrovia and its environs. Much of the remainder of the country, however, remains under the control of NPFL and ULIMO. Under the auspices of ECOWAS, negotiations between the Liberian parties led to a series of agreements which formed the basis of an ECOWAS peace plan of November 1990. This plan, inter alia, called for:

- A cease-fire and cessation of destruction of life and property;

- ECOWAS monitoring of the cease-fire;

- The establishment of a broad-based Interim Government acceptable to the people of Liberia;

- The holding of general and presidential elections within 12 months; and

- Observation of the elections by ECOWAS and other international bodies to ensure that they are free and fair.

16. Following further discussions and negotiations among Liberians themselves and between Liberians and ECOWAS member States, agreements were reached at meetings held in 1991 at Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, on steps to implement the broad outlines of the ECOWAS peace plan. The Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991 specifies the steps, which taken together, constitute a framework for the settlement of the crisis. Specifically, these steps included the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG and the establishment of institutions to carry out free and fair elections.

17. In view of the widespread fighting, it was not possible to carry out the measures envisaged in the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. The recognition by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations of the Interim Government headed by President Amos Sawyer and the unwillingness of one of the main factions, the NPFL, headed by Mr. Charles Taylor, to recognize ECOMOG as an impartial and neutral force, led to a prolonged stalemate.

18. The United Nations has, from the beginning of the crisis in Liberia, supported efforts of ECOWAS member States to achieve a just and lasting solution to the conflict. In 1990, my predecessor had apprised the Security Council of actions being taken by ECOWAS with respect to Liberia so that they might consider how international assistance could best be provided to ECOMOG. He had also underlined his support for the ECOWAS peace plan and appealed to all sides to cooperate fully with ECOMOG.

19. The inability to move forward with the ECOWAS peace plan led to intensified efforts to break the stalemate. In this context the need for the involvement of the United Nations became more evident. ECOWAS, at the fifteenth session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Dakar, Senegal, from 27 to 29 July 1992, decided to impose comprehensive sanctions against the territory controlled by the NPFL. The ECOWAS Summit sought the assistance of the Security Council to make sanctions effective and binding on all members of the international community in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

20. At the First Joint Meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five of ECOWAS, held at Cotonou on 20 October 1992, and the First Meeting of the Committee of Nine of ECOWAS on the Liberian Crisis, held in Abuja on 7 November 1992, it was decided that a delegation of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers should come to New York to seek the endorsement of the Security Council for the path being followed by ECOWAS. I was represented at these meetings, and at all previous important ECOWAS meetings on Liberia, by Mr. James Jonah, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs.

IV. ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

21. My Special Representative visited Liberia as well as Benin, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia and Burkina Faso from 29 November to 22 December 1992 and again from 10 January to 2 February 1993. He provided me with a preliminary assessment of the outcome of the first half of his mission on 29 December 1992 at Geneva.

22. In an exchange of views with the different heads of Government and officials of ECOWAS, my Special Representative explained the purpose of his mission. In separate meetings with Presidents Nicephore Soglo of Benin, Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Dawda Jawara of the Gambia, Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso and with Prime Minister Habib Thiam of Senegal and with Vice-Chairman Solomon Musa of the National Provisional Ruling Council of Sierra Leone, and their Foreign Ministers, they all expressed their appreciation for the support of the United Nations to the endeavours of ECOWAS in the search for a peaceful solution to the Liberian conflict. They also emphasized the need for continued support by the international community for the efforts of ECOWAS to bring peace and stability to the region; only then would ECOWAS be able to concentrate on its primary goal of attaining economic integration in the subregion.

23. President Nicephore Soglo of Benin, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, stressed to the Special Representative the view that there was a clear role for the United Nations in monitoring a cease-fire, encampment, disarmament,

demobilization and the organization of free and fair elections. In view of the level of mistrust among the various protagonists, President Soglo felt that a greater United Nations involvement would ensure successful implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.

24. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Chairman of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Liberia, viewed with grave concern the conflict in Liberia and its implications for Côte d'Ivoire and the region. Notwithstanding the strict control instituted by his Government, the President pointed out some of the difficulties of policing the long border of some 580 kilometres with Liberia. These difficulties were further compounded by the fact that the population on both sides of the border belonged to the same ethnic groups and in some instances, the same family. In spite of these problems, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire fully supported the relevant decision of the Security Council on an arms embargo and the ECOWAS decision on economic sanctions.

25. In a meeting at the headquarters of ECOWAS in Lagos, the Executive Secretary, Mr. Abass Bundu, and the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Adetunji Olurin, recalled the Banjul decision establishing ECOMOG and the conditions which obtained in Monrovia when ECOMOG was first deployed to Liberia in August 1990. They also called attention to the fact that ECOMOG deployment was strongly opposed by Mr. Charles Taylor. Having succeeded in stopping the advance of NPFL, ECOMOG proceeded in the traditional peace-keeping role to commence planning for encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the warring factions. However, the NPFL infiltration and attack on Monrovia on 15 October 1992 obliged ECOMOG to defend and protect the capital by adopting a peace enforcement mode. To ensure that Monrovia was no longer threatened by NPFL and in order to reduce civilian casualties, ECOMOG continued to repel NPFL forces. They also referred to the fact that the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) has ceased to exist as a warring faction after the surrender of its leader, Mr. Prince Johnson, to ECOMOG.

26. In Liberia, the Special Representative had extensive consultations with all the parties to the conflict. He also met with a wide range of NGOs and civic, religious and voluntary associations.

27. President Amos Sawyer supported the call by ECOWAS for United Nations involvement in the peace process within the context of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. He provided the Special Representative with historical details regarding the decisions of the All-Liberia National Conference in Virginia, Liberia, 15 March to 18 April 1991, establishing the Interim Government. He recounted the decisions with respect to the organization and functioning of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The composition of the Elections Commission and the Supreme Court as well as arrangements for monitoring general and presidential elections were also discussed. He stressed that for the ECOWAS peace initiative to succeed, it was imperative that all concerned parties honour commitments made to achieve a lasting settlement of the conflict. For his part, he was ready for a genuine dialogue in order to expedite a settlement. President Sawyer also emphasized the need for the United Nations to continue rendering humanitarian assistance to all Liberians. He underlined that the United Nations should remain sensitive to and supportive of the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve the crisis in Liberia.

28. Mr. Charles Taylor, leader of NPFL, expressed his willingness to agree to a cease-fire and to talks with other parties to the conflict, leading to free and fair elections, so long as the United Nations would facilitate and be fully involved in the process. He voiced concerns for his personal security, because he was convinced that ECOMOG was no longer a neutral peace-keeping force. His reasoning rested on the historical involvement of ECOWAS member States in the creation of the Interim Government in Banjul, July 1990, which he maintained contravened the existing constitution. Further, the capture of President Doe in September 1990, while on the premises of ECOMOG and his subsequent assassination, did not inspire confidence for his own safety. He argued that the dominance of Nigeria in ECOMOG was at variance with a traditional multinational peace-keeping force. Mr. Taylor complained that persistent bombing attacks by ECOMOG of civilian targets, as recently as 27 February 1993, resulted in extensive casualties. Finally, he asserted that ECOMOG sponsorship of ULIMO and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) nullified the basis for the arms embargo contained in Security Council resolution 788 (1992).

29. In Tubmanburg, Mr. Alhaji Kromah and the military command of ULIMO confirmed that the Movement was united, that it supported the ECOWAS peace plan and that it existed with the sole purpose of ending the conflict and would disband once the NPFL agreed to cessation of hostilities.

30. Since the adoption of the ECOWAS peace plan, many cease-fire agreements have been broken. Taking these factors into account, ECOWAS leaders and the warring factions are in agreement that there needs to be a role for the United Nations by providing observers. Arrangements envisaged in this regard would link the deployment of United Nations observers with the signature of a cease-fire agreement. It was suggested that the United Nations observers, numbering approximately 200, would take up positions, along with ECOMOG, between the various combatants, as well as at the ports and border crossings with Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

31. In order to facilitate implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, most interlocutors with the Special Representative stressed that encampment should commence concurrent with announcement of an agreed cease-fire. All existing military checkpoints established by various combatants should be removed. Such checkpoints as may be needed after the cessation of hostilities should be administered by ECOMOG. They called for agreement between the Interim Government, NPFL, ULIMO and ECOMOG on the location of these checkpoints to guard against any unauthorized activity. In their view, gradual relaxation of these arrangements would send clear signals that the cease-fire was holding and people should be able to move freely throughout the country.

32. Notwithstanding some agreement among the various parties, basic differences still exist with respect to the process of disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants. The NPFL is insistent that it will not disarm to ECOMOG in its present composition. In the light of this intense mistrust, these concerns could be addressed by reconfiguring ECOMOG by more members of ECOWAS participating in it, while retaining the present command structure. It is generally agreed that broadening the participation in ECOMOG of forces from those ECOWAS countries which have not, or only marginally, been involved in the monitoring group, would provide the guarantees which Mr. Taylor seeks. However, such a reconfiguration of ECOMOG would require additional resources.

33. The reconciliation process would be greatly enhanced by progress in the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the ex-combatants on the basis of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. While in Monrovia, my Special Representative had the opportunity to meet with the Inter-Faith Mediation Council, comprising representatives of religious groups and organizations as well as leaders of public opinion in Liberia who, at the outset of the conflict, played an important role. Following his exchange of views with these organizations on the question of national reconciliation, my Special Representative has stressed the need to involve elders, community leaders and women's groups, in the search for lasting solutions to the long-standing causes of ethnic conflict. This would be an essential step to a major national reconciliation conference, organized and conducted by Liberians, which would address participatory democracy, the strengthening of civil society and reconstruction and development of the country.

34. As indicated earlier in the report, the number of Liberian refugees is estimated between 600,000 and 700,000. Many of these refugees are already registered with UNHCR. It is important to repatriate the refugees promptly after the cease-fire has been verified as sustainable, for two reasons: unburdening the neighbouring countries and ensuring the participation of the returnees in the electoral process. In order to facilitate this, UNHCR will be requested to update its information, including final destination of returnees, and make it available to the central database for preparing voters' lists. Resources for transportation and other assistance will also be required for repatriation.

35. In recent discussions of the Special Representative in Monrovia and Gbarnga, headquarters of NPFL, consideration was given to the polling date of 26 July 1993, the anniversary of national independence. However, continued hostilities now seem to rule out that date. An election date in October 1993 would be consistent with existing constitutional provisions. Whatever date is finally chosen, it would be desirable to have conditions which would allow for an agreement on a unified administration, complete freedom of movement, disarmament and encampment as essential ingredients for free and fair elections.

36. Decisions taken in ECOWAS meetings in Dakar on 27-29 July 1992 and Cotonou on 20 October 1992 and reaffirmed at Abuja on 7 November 1992, requested the United Nations to assist in the electoral process. Other international observers, for example, the International Negotiation Network (Carter Centre), the Republican Institute for International Affairs and the National Democratic Institute, both of the United States, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth Secretariat, could also be invited to participate in monitoring the elections. Financial and technical assistance will be necessary at various stages for registration of voters, preparation of reliable voters' lists, delineation of constituency boundaries and in the general oversight, to ensure the credibility and integrity of the electoral process.

37. Regrettably, the resumption of fighting in Liberia in October 1992 continues at the present time. ECOMOG has succeeded in regaining control of Monrovia and surrounding areas and has recently taken over the international airport at Roberts Field, as well as White Plains, the source of Monrovia's water supply. ULIMO forces have meanwhile made advances beyond Cape Mount and

Bomi counties. The intensification of the conflict and the wanton death and destruction which inevitably follow could threaten regional stability. This makes it imperative to continue the search for a lasting peace in Liberia and the surrounding countries.

V. OBSERVATIONS

38. The consultations of my Special Representative indicate that all of the warring factions in Liberia continue to accept the Yamoussoukro IV Accord as the most realistic basis on which a durable peace can be constructed. An essential first step in this process is the cessation of hostilities, to be followed by immediate encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the forces of the warring factions.

39. As in similar situations in other parts of the world, in Liberia, too, it is the common people, for the most part, who have become the innocent victims of the civil war. This is particularly the case in regard to women, the aged and the very young. The United Nations, its agencies and the international NGO community have made a significant contribution, often in very difficult circumstances, to provide humanitarian assistance to the Liberian people without any discrimination. My Special Representative has devoted particular attention to this matter in his discussions in Liberia, in order to ensure safe routes and corridors so that no section of the target community is deprived of at least the basic essentials.

40. Liberia represents a good example of systematic cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organization, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. From the beginning, diplomatic and even military initiatives have been taken by ECOWAS. The Yamoussoukro IV Accord was arrived at as a result of the efforts of ECOWAS and it has been the responsibility of ECOWAS to ensure the implementation of the provisions of that Accord. The role of the Security Council has been one of supporting the initiatives and endeavours of ECOWAS. This is clear from the presidential statements issued by the Council on 22 January 1991 and 7 May 1992. It was at the initiative of ECOWAS that the Security Council convened on 19 November 1992 and adopted resolution 788 (1992). I believe that it would be the wish of the Council to continue and expand, as appropriate, this cooperative relationship between the United Nations and the concerned regional body.

41. The comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS are an important part of ECOWAS efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The Security Council, for its part, supplemented ECOWAS action by imposing an arms embargo in its resolution 788 (1992). If requested, I would be willing to send a few experts who would extend technical assistance to ECOWAS in monitoring the sanctions. The Security Council may also wish to consider enlarging the scope of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.

42. The discussions my Special Representative has had with the leaders of the warring factions as well as with the President of the Interim Government, the Executive Secretary and member States of ECOWAS indicate that there is a general consensus to the effect that the United Nations should assume a larger role in the search for peace in Liberia. The international community has an interest in the restoration of conditions of peace and stability in Liberia and in the West African subregion as a whole. One proposal, which has the support of all the parties as well as of ECOWAS, is that I should convene a meeting of the President of the Interim Government and the warring factions at which they would solemnly conclude and sign an agreement reaffirming their commitment to the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, as well as to implement promptly the various steps envisaged therein within an agreed time-frame. I am ready to extend whatever assistance I can to bring about an end to the senseless killings in Liberia. While I would be prepared, in principle, to convene such a meeting, I feel that it would be more appropriate if ECOWAS were to consider the situation in Liberia, preferably at summit level, to bring about the desired reconfirmation of the commitment of parties to the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. I have been informed by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS about the meeting of that organization on 15-16 April, at which the heads of State would consider, inter alia, the Liberian situation. The United Nations, which must continue to play its supportive role, will be represented by Mr. Gordon-Somers, my Special Representative for Liberia.

43. Accordingly, I am asking my Special Representative to return to the region to resume his discussions with ECOWAS as well as with others concerned regarding the meeting mentioned above. He will also initiate discussions among the United Nations agencies and with the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development Bank on future rehabilitation and reconstruction plans for Liberia.

Notes

1/ ECOWAS membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

2/ Membership of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal (withdrew January 1993) and Sierra Leone.